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1. lntroduction 
In politico-economic research there are two major approaches to the study of 
the relationship between unemployment and politics. They differ in what they 
take to be the dependent and the independent variable. The first approach 
investigates the impact of political control of the economy and, specifically, of 
labor market policies on unemployment; the second approach attempts to 
clarify the effects of unemployment on political outcomes, i.e., mainly on 
voting or other indicators of political support or alienation. This chapter falls 
into the second category by presenting some findings on how voting outcomes 
in the ten German federal elections from 1953 to 1987 have been related to 
unemployment. 
Studies of the impact of unemployment on political outcomes have a 
tradition dating back over fifty years. In terms of research design they have 
diversified considerably. Using a combination of the two dichotomies of ag-
gregate- versus individual-level analysis and of cross-sectional versus longitu-
dinal designs, most of the early investigations, in the context of the economic 
crises of the 1920s and l 930s, can be characterized as cross-sectional aggre-
gate data studies ( see, e. g. , the pertinent chapters in Rice 1928, or the review 
of tbe literature in Rattinger 1980). The renaissance of studies of empirical 
political economy, stimulated by the seminal articles by Goodhart and Bhan-
sali (1970) and Kramer (1971), on the other hand, tended to focus on the 
longitudinal impact of unemployment on voting or "popularity functions," 
usually at the highest level of aggregation, i.e., the national level (see Paldam 
1981). 
In addition, the spread of survey technology has also inspired attempts to 
ascertain the political effects of unemployment at the individual level. In this 
type of analysis, these effects have mainly been treated as being due either to 
the role of unemployment as a political issue (how bad is it, how salient, who 
is to blame, which political force is competent to solve the problem, etc.) or to 
personal experience with unemployment (see Schlozman and Verba 1979; 
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Krieger 1985). This diversification of approaches has not led to truly cumula-
tive research with a solid theoretical integration of empirical findings from 
these various designs. lnstead, empirical contradictions have been reported 
(see, e.g., Rattinger 1981), and (not quite convincing) claims to propose the 
"one and only" research strategy have been advanced (e.g., Kramer 1983). 
This chapter does not claim to overcome the theoretical and empirical 
puzzles surrounding the quest for the political effects of unemployment. In-
stead, it goes back to the old-fashioned type of data mentioned first (i.e., 
cross-sectional aggregate data) in an attempt to see what they reveal about this 
relationship for the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) if-instead of a 
single cross-section-a series of such sets of data is analyzed. In this way, one 
of the major shortcomings of cross-sectional aggregate data analysis can be 
avoided, i.e., the lack of any temporal or dynamic dimension. This type of 
analysis has only now become possible for the FRG at a reasonably low level 
of aggregation, because appropriate data (see sec. 3) have only recently been 
compiled. 
2. Theory 
Before describing data, methods, and findings, a few words on what to expect 
are in order. To what extent one regards such considerations as "theory" is a 
matter of taste. For this author, the temptation to put quotation marks around 
the title ofthis section is almost irresistible. Even at the individual level 1 have 
some difficulty disceming any truly theoretical formulations linking unem-
ployment (as an issue, a threat, or a personal experience) to political attitudes 
or behavior (probably the classical Downsian calculus of voting or some 
sociopsychological theorizing about the effects of "deprivation" come clos-
est). But here we are dealing with territorial units that are described by their 
unemployment and their distributions of political preferences. Where is the 
pertinent theory? 
Even if we ignore all dangers of cross-level theorizing, and proceed as if 
we could argue in the context of aggregate data analysis as we would for 
individuals, we can only start with a few general notions that are sometimes 
contradictory and in need of further conceptual distinctions. This latter neces-
sity is obvious both for dependent and for independent variables. For the 
political outcome variables, we first have to distinguish between a political 
mobilization versus demobilization component and a partisan support compo-
nent. The latter has to be subdivided, again, into a conventional versus an 
unconventional component. Theoretically, unemployment thus can be related 
to the Level of political involvement (for the aggregate level this mainly means 
tumout, of course), to the distribution of power among the forces established 
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within the political system, and to the incidence of more fundamental discon-
tent and alienation from the political system. 
For our independent variable (i.e., unemployment) the necessary distinc-
tions depend upon the level of analysis. With cross-sectional aggregate data, 
unemployment is indicative of at least two different things. First, it tells us 
something about the regional distribution of economic well-being and oppor-
tunities, and it reflects local economic structure. Second, the distributions of 
changes in unemployment mirror the local impact of the global business 
cycle. Both dimensions are not independent, but their interrelationship does 
not have to be uniform over time (and it is not, empirically). 
The lack of predictive theory can be expressed very simply: We have 
little solid theoretical ground from which to infer which component of unem-
ployment should be related to which dimension of the political outcome in 
which functional way. If we stick to the simple calculus of the rational voter's 
decision as developed by Downs (1957), and if we are willing to ignore 
problems of aggregation, we could derive some straightforward predictions 
based upon incumbency: high and/or rising unemployment should distract 
from the electoral support of incumbent parties. However, this basic logic of 
"bad times hurt the ins" tells us little about who would benefit, whether it 
should be the major opposition parties, radical fringe groups, or the "party of 
the nonvoters." Moreover, the simple incumbency-oriented logic has not re-
mained unchallenged, because it ignores long-standing partisan identifications 
and the relation between the economic interests and the political affiliations of 
social groups or classes (see Hibbs 1977; Kiewiet 1983). Policy-oriented 
reasoning that takes such considerations into account would not predict, for 
example, that a left-wing govemment should be hurt by unemployment to the 
same extent as a right-wing govemment would be. 
These arguments suffice to illustrate the difficulties that arise when famil-
iar theorizing on the political impact of economic conditions is applied to the 
cross-sectional, aggregate-level linkage between unemployment and elec-
tions. Therefore, the rest of this chapter does not contain rigorous hypothesis 
testing. Instead, it aims at a reasonable description of the development, over 
time, of the cross-sectional relationship between some aspects of unemploy-
ment and electoral outcomes in the FRG, briefly interpreting these findings 
within the rudimentary conceptual and theoretical framework that has just 
been referred to. 
3. Data and Research Design 
Any attempt to relate West German election results to unemployment in a lon-
gitudinally comparable way at an aggregate level below the states (Laender) 
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faces two problems. First, the territorial units for both types of data are not the 
same; federal constituencies do not correspond to the regional structure of the 
labor administration. Second, neither of these two territorial units has re-
mained constant over time; constituencies have been redistricted, and the 
labor administration has (with some time lag) attempted to keep up with 
the wave of territorial reforms that swept the FRG from the 1960s to the 
mid-1970s. 
For these reasons a comprehensive aggregate data set for the 327 coun-
ties (Kreise) of the FRG in their current boundaries was constructed that, 
besides numerous other data, contains results of federal elections and unem-
ployment rates. These two subsets from the comprehensive data set are the 
basis for most of the analyses in this chapter. Unfortunately, however, results 
of the 1987 federal election had not yet become available at the county level at 
the time of writing, so that for this most recent election, data for constituen-
cies (Wahlkreise) had to be used. Thus, we have one data set containing 
election statistics for 1949-83 and annual September unemployment rates for 
1951-86 for the 327 counties (due to missing data for Lower Saxony and 
Saarland, N is only 274 for 1949, and 321 for 1953), and a second data set 
containing the same data for 1983-87 for 248 constituencies. Table 1 reports 
average partisan vote shares, unemployment rates, and changes of unemploy-
ment rates over the preceding year for the ten federal elections during 1953-
87. Note that unemployment and partisan percentages in this table are not 
identical with the official aggregate statistics, because they are computed as 
TABLE 1. Mean Values of Party Vote Shares and of Unemployment, 1983-87 
Year of CDU/ 
Election N Tumout CSU 
1953 321 83.7 46.7 
1957 327 84.3 52.0 
1961 327 82.1 48.2 
1965 327 81.9 50.7 
1969 327 82.2 49.8 
1972 327 87.3 48.5 
1976 327 88.7 52.1 
1980 327 87.7 47.8 
1983 327 88.2 51.8 
1987 248 84.3 44.1 
SPD 
26.0 
28.9 
33.5 
36.3 
39.0 
43.1 
39.8 
40.4 
35.7 
37.2 
FDP 
9.4 
7.4 
12.1 
9.4 
5.3 
7.5 
7.3 
9.7 
6.8 
9.0 
Green 
Party 
1.5 
5.2 
8.3 
All Unem-
Other ployment 
Parties Rate 
17.9 6.4 
11.7 2.3 
6.3 .5 
3.6 1.2 
5.9 .5 
1.0 1.0 
0.9 4.2 
0.4 3.7 
0.5 8.2 
1.4 9.2 
Change 
in Un-
employ-
ment 
-0.7 
-0.1 
-0.1 
0.3 
-0.4 
0.2 
-0.6 
0.4 
2.5 
-0.4 
Note: Unemployment rates are for September preceding the election. Change in unemployment is defined as the 
September unemployment rate preceding the election minus the rate one year earlier. Unless otherwise noted, all 
subsequent analyses are based on the numbers of cases indicated in the second column of this table. 
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averages across counties; also note that vote percentages are those cast for 
party lists (Zweitstimmen). 
1 suspect that bivariate correlations between turnout and party vote 
shares, on the one band, and unemployment rates and their changes preceding 
elections, on the other band, are spurious due to a common dependence of 
both unemployment and electoral outcomes on the social structure of coun-
tries, notably the shares of blue-collar or unskilled workers. As the data set 
does not yet contain data on the social structure of counties, its effect cannot 
be controlled directly. Failing to do so somehow, however, would not only 
produce spurious findings, but would also exaggerate the stability of associa-
tions between unemployment and election outcomes over time. Both party 
strength and the structural aspect of unemployment correlate considerably 
over time, indicating that parties tend to remain strong and unemployment 
tends to remain comparatively high where this has previously been the case, at 
least in the short- to medium-term perspective. In other words, cross-sectional 
nnemployment rates and party votes shares for subsequent elections measure 
similar things, and thus should be related similarly. 
Since data to control for the social structure of counties were not avail-
able, a simple alternative was pursued. First, tumout and party vote shares 
were regressed on the corresponding variables from the preceding election, 
and then residuals from these regressions were used as dependent variables in 
subsequent steps of the analysis. Provided that the impact of structural back-
ground variables on the regional distribution of voting pattems remains 
roughly the same in two subsequent elections, which can be reasonably as-
sumed, these residuals should correlate only very little with such background 
variables. The strong temporal stability that described most percentages of 
party votes, in fact, is largely absent from these vote residuals. 
Before investigating the impact of unemployment and of its change on 
the cross-sectional distribution of these vote residuals, two more problems of 
this research design have to be addressed. The first is whether controlling for 
structural correlates of party strength by analyzing residuals from auto-
regressive models really leads to similar results, as explicit controls of such 
variables would. Fortunately, the 1987 data set at the constituency level con-
tains some variables of this sort in addition to unemployment and voting. 
Therefore, 1987 constituency election results were not only regressed on 1983 
vote shares, but also (in separate zero-order models) on the number of people 
employed in mining and production per thousand inhabitants, on the percent-
age of wage-eamers employed in the service sector, on the number of farms, 
of newly completed housing units, and of people moving to the constituency 
per thousand inhabitants, and, finally, on the overall percentage change in the 
number employed. These zero-order models explain between about 30 percent 
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(for tumout) and about 60 percent (for CDU/CSU and SPD) of the constitu-
ency variance in 1987 election outcomes. Their residuals were again saved 
and regressed on the unemployment rate and its change preceding the elec-
tion. If one compares 1987 results for the two types of voting residuals, i.e., 
from autoregressive and from structural zero-order models, it is obvious that 
the correspondence between the two sets of findings in terms of direction and 
strength of associations is quite close, so that the approach adopted here can 
be assumed not to distort substantive findings. 
The second problem concerns the difference in units of analysis for 
1953-83 versus 1987. This difference is not only in the number of cases (327 
versus 248), but, more important, in the size distributions of the units. Con-
stituencies in 1987 ranged from 165,000 to 315,000 inhabitants, but counties 
(in their current boundaries) are as small as only 35,000 people, and as large 
as cities like Munich or Hamburg with upwards of a million. Therefore, for 
1983 the county-level analysis was duplicated with constituency data in order 
to ascertain whether the use of constituency data for 1987 should be expected 
to lead to discontinuities against the 1953-83 findings. Comparing these two 
sets of 1983 results shows that there is no strong systematic deviation. 
4. Results 
The results obtained by regression party vote residuals from the autoregressive 
models on the county unemployment rate and the change of this rate preced-
ing each election are presented in tables 2-4. lnspecting them for continuities 
and meaningful patterns of associations between unemployment and election 
outcomes, one feels confronted with the proverbial glass of water: Is it half 
füll or half empty? Some relationships appear to be stable over time and to 
make sense in terms of the theoretical speculations presented earlier; others 
appear to be more random. In addressing these findings one by one, we will 
start with the effects of unemployment as they emerge from these data, later 
turning to changes in unemployment over time. 
The series of coefficients linking unemployment rates to turnout (table 2) 
indicates a predominantly negative effect (seven out of ten coefficients). This 
might, to some extent, still reflect structural influences, e.g., the dimension of 
urbanization. However, what is puzzling is the occurrence of three quite 
strong positive coefficients (in 1957, 1976, and 1987), two of which are 
significantly different from zero, which forces us to conclude that a univer-
sally negative impact of unemployment on the regional distribution of tumout 
cannot be established with these data, even though a tendency to this effect is 
clearly visible. 
Ambiguity is even stroriger concerning the impact of unemployment on 
the combined vote shares of the parties of the goveming coalition (table 3). 
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TABLE 2. Standardized Coefficients for 
Regressions of Turnout Residuals on 
Unemployment, 1953-87 
Change in 
Unemployment Unemployment 
Year Rate Rate Constant 
1953 -.19** -.05 0.83 
1957 .II .10 -0.34 
1961 -.09 .20*** 0.45* 
1965 -.29 .35* 0.03 
1969 -.II .08 0.27* 
1972 -.04 -.08 0.20 
1976 .29*** -.01 -3.09*** 
1980 -.13* .04 0.53 
1983 -.48*** .38*** 0.66** 
1987 .33*** .13* -0.65*** 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Seven of these ten coefficients are positive, but only twice (1961 and 1972) 
can they really be said tobe different from zero. On the other hand, for 1965, 
1983, and 1987, we find moderate to strong negative coefficients. Consider-
ing the party composition of the govemment, one can say that no federal 
govemment with Social Democratic participation ( 1969-80) has been hurt 
electorally by unemployment. In view of the number of cases one would not 
want to invest too much confidence in this assertion, however. 
Tuming now to the three established parties of the FRG, we see that 
TABLE 3. Standardized Coefficients for 
Regressions of Government Vote Residuals on 
Unemployment, 1953-87 
Change in 
Unemployment Unemployment 
Year Rate Rate Constant 
1953 .09 .00 -0.92 
1957 .06 .06 -0.34 
1961 .37*** .10 -2.38*** 
1965 -.37* .40* 0.53 
1969 .07 .20** 0.14 
1972 .43*** .03 -1.38*** 
1976 .05 .15* -0.06 
1980 .02 .03 -0.46 
1983 -.15 .05 1.84 
1987 -.32*** .18** 1.66*** 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
TABLE 4. Standardized Coefficients for 
Regressions of Party Vote Residuals on 
Unemployment, 1953-87 
Change in 
Unemployment Unemployment 
Year Rate Rate Constant 
CDU/CSU 
1953 .25*** -.II -2.86*** 
1957 .18** .14 -1.02* 
1961 .43*** .14** -2.44 
1965 -.34* .37* 0.50 
1969 - .12*** .09 0.56** 
1972 -.26*** -.16* 1.20*** 
1976 -.06 -.18** 0.04 
1980 -.01 -.05 0.38 
1983 -.13 .07 1.11 
1987 -.17** .01 0.73* 
SPD 
1953 .06 .09 -0.21 
1957 .28*** -.05 -0.83*** 
1961 -.10 .03 0.41 
1965 .49** -.47** -0.92 
1969 .08 .29*** 0.36 
1972 .50*** -.03 -1.90*** 
1976 -.03 .09 0.24 
1980 .06 .04 -1.06 
1983 .24** -.06 -3.14*** 
1987 .49*** -.32*** -3.70*** 
FDP 
1953 -.16* .12 0.79** 
1957 -.35*** .02 1.41 *** 
1961 .09 .02 -0.37 
1965 -.17 .14 0.17 
1969 -.10 -.02 0.11 
1972 -.30*** .28*** 0.37** 
1976 -.15* .18** 0.47** 
1980 .12* -.08 -0.38 
1983 -.67*** .20* 2.26*** 
1987 -.01 .22*** 0.12 
Green Party 
1983 -.20* .02 0.72** 
1987 -.40*** .15** 1.00*** 
(continued) 
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TABLE 4-Continued 
Change in 
Unemployment Unemployment 
Year Rate Rate Constant 
All Other Parties 
1953 .23*** -.15* -1.83*** 
1957 -.01 -.18** -0.07 
1961 -.14* .01 0.40* 
1965 .04 -.28** 0.44** 
1969 .00 -.15* -0.20 
1972 -.23** .00 0.08*** 
1976 .03 .01 -0.01 
1980 .06 -.15** 0.00 
1983 .02 -.32*** 0.13*** 
1987 -.57*** - .17*** 0.75*** 
*p < .05. ••p < .01. ***p < .001. 
unemployment has affected the distribution of their electoral successes or 
disadvantages in a somewhat more consistent and stable fashion (table 4). The 
most coherent picture is obtained for the SPD; the cross-sectional deviations 
of this party's actual vote from expected vote shares have almost always been 
positively related to local unemployment. The two coefficients not conform-
ing to this pattern (1961 and 1976) are very small; all five significant coeffi-
cients are positive. 
For the Christian Democrats there is a reversal of this association be-
tween the 1950s and the period since the mid-1960s. In the first period we 
have a strong positive relation between unemployment and CDU/CSU vote 
shares above expectations; since the 1965 election this relationship is nega-
tive. Possible explanations may be found in two respects. First, in the l 950s, 
the CDU/CSU was the party identified most closely with the rapid economic 
recovery of the country (Wirtschaftswunder); its absorption of other right-
wing parties, which were still quite strong in the first three federal elections, 
had plenty to do with this identification. So, excess support for the CDU/CSU 
in areas with still higher unemployment might have reftected the hope of 
catching up with the national downward trend of unemployment under this 
party's leadership. Second, unemployment in the 1950s was concentrated not 
only in urban-industrial areas, but also in rural areas where the CDU/CSU has 
bad its strongholds from the beginning. With the concentration of the party 
system and the disappearance of unemployment as a pressing national prob-
lem, the relationship between unemployment and the electoral fortunes of the 
two major parties could develop into a lasting zero-sum constellation. 
For the Free Democrats (FDP), high unemployment has almost con-
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sistently meant vote shares below expectations. Only 1961 and 1980 have 
deviated from this pattem, the latter deviation being statistically significant. 
Since this party could never be considered to have a particular appeal for those 
social strata most affected by unemployment, this finding does not come as a 
surprise. For the residual vote shares of the new Green party and of all other 
parties combined, the relationship with local unemployment is also predomi-
nantly negative. This is very clearly so for the Greens, but for the remaining 
parties five coefficients are positive and five are negative. However, out of the 
five positive coefficients only the very first one (1953) has a more than 
negligible magnitude. We can thus summarize these findings by saying that 
only the Social Democrats' residual vote shares have covaried positively with 
local unemployment over the 1953-87 federal elections, whereas (apart from 
a few exceptions for the CDU/CSU up to the early 1960s) the opposite has 
been the case for all other parties. 
Conceptually and empirically, levels of unemployment and their changes 
over time are not the same. Therefore, we should not necessarily expect 
findings on the electoral correlates of the changes in unemployment preceding 
elections to be identical with those just described for unemployment levels 
themselves. For turnout and the combined share of govemment parties, our 
data clearly show that these variables tend to be above expectations in areas 
where unemployment grows more strongly or falls less quickly than average. 
For turnout, three coefficients, and for the govemment parties only one coeffi-
cient, have a deviant sign; all of these are very small. For both variables, four 
positive coefficients are significantly different from zero. Thus, while turnout 
residuals usually covary negatively with unemployment levels, they are asso-
ciated positively with changes of unemployment. While deviations of govern-
ment vote shares from expectations did not have a uniform relationship with 
unemployment levels over time, they have almost consistently (but only 
mildly) covaried positively with changes in local unemployment. This find-
ing, of course, can be set directly against the incumbency-oriented hypothesis: 
in repeated cross-sections for West German federal elections it is flatly 
contradicted. 
At first sight, coefficients for the two major parties, the CDU/CSU and 
SPD, appear to vary randomly; positive signs balance negative ones, and 
coefficients in both directions are significantly different from zero. One could 
provide speculative case histories of individual elections, of course, drawing 
upon contemporary macroeconomic conditions and relevant issues to account 
for these variations. For lack of space this will not be attempted. Instead, I 
would suggest that these changes might have something to do with a party's 
participation in the government. Remembering what has just been said about 
government vote shares, it is striking that for the CDU/CSU, except in 1953, 
all coefficients are positive when this party was in power, and vice versa. 
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Similarly, for the SPD the same holds with the exception of 1953, 1961, and 
1972, these deviant coefficients being very low in magnitude. That the major 
party of govemment coalitions cross-sectionally receives vote shares above 
expectations with unemployment rising more or falling less than average 
conforms to the results about govemment vote shares, but again contradicts 
hypotheses about anti-incumbent effects. 
The same thing can be said about the FDP, which almost always has been 
apart of the govemment coalition. Eight out of ten coefficients are positive, 
four of them significantly different from zero, and the two negative ones ( one 
in 1969, when the FDP was in the opposition) are very small. Together with 
the results for the two major parties, this clearly is consistent with the equa-
tions for residual govemment vote shares. 
In terms of the relation between its vote shares and changes in unemploy-
ment, the Green party is unlike the other minor parties. Whereas positive 
coefficients are obtained for 1983 and 1987 for the Greens, this association for 
all the other parties is strictly negative. Seven out of ten coefficients are 
negative and significant; the other three are practically zero ( 1961, 1972, and 
1976). Neither high Ievels nor increases in unemployment have ever been 
conducive to the electoral success of minor parties in the FRG in a cross-
sectional perspective. In sum, given the research design used here, we cannot 
observe many of the political consequences that are often ascribed to changes 
in unemploymcnt. There is little indication of a response pattem resembling 
apathy (which probably is too grand a term when dealing with fluctuations of 
tumout), there is no anti-incumbent effect (rather the opposite), and the more 
exotic parties at both extremes of the political spectrum do not benefit (rather 
the opposite again). They succeed above expectations where both unemploy-
ment levels and their changes are less of a problem than elsewhere. Whether 
the regional distribution of the successes of the Green party will establish a 
lasting exception to this pattem remains tobe seen. 
1 now carry the cross-sectional analysis one step further. In politico-
economic research, the idea has often been expressed that economic variables 
should not necessarily be expected to have uniform effects at all levels. Some 
important notions in this context are those of "negative voting," of "asym-
metric response" to boom or recession, or of threshold levels that determine 
whether or not there will be any political effect (see, e.g., Bloom and Price 
1975; Kemell 1977). A simple version of such considerations is that political 
responses could be different (i.e., as a rule stronger) in regions that are more 
affected by the problem if compared to regions that are less affected. Thus, 
each unemployment level in the data set was split into two variables, accord-
ing to whether a county was below or above average, with one new variable 
being identical to the original variable in all above-average counties and zero 
elsewhere, and the second new variable being identical to the original variable 
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in all below-average counties and zero elsewhere. The same split at the mean 
was performed for changes in unemployment, and the whole analysis for 
tables 2-4 was rerun with these four new variables, instead of the two original 
unemployment variables. 
Due to limitations of space, only the major results can be highlighted. 
Generally, this split of variables does not change the overall fit of models a 
great deal. However, there is a clear difference between the level of unem-
ployment and changes in unemployment in the extent to which this split is 
useful and leads to the expected pattems. For unemployment levels, the ex-
pectation that political responses will be stronger at higher levels than at lower 
ones is bome out by the data almost without exception. For changes in 
unemployment, this is less clear; for more than half of these coefficients this 
split either leads to results that are inconclusive or contradict the expectation. 
This suggests that the assumption of uniformity of relationships is much more 
clearly contradicted for the first type of data than for the latter one. This 
attempt to carry the analysis a little further thus also demonstrates that some of 
the puzzles still present in the series of coefficients in tables 2-4 could 
possibly be resolved if the assumption of cross-sectional uniformity of the 
political impact of unemployment were given up in favor of a systematic 
search for structural sources of regional variations of this effect. 
5. Conclusion: Problems for Further Research 
This chapter has presented only a few findings on the political correlates of 
unemployment in the FRG that can be derived from this data base, and it has 
followed a simple research design. What can and should be the next steps? 
Obviously they can be separated into those that adhere to the cross-sectional 
design pursued here, and those that try to fully exploit the longitudinal compo-
nent of these data. Following the logic of the first approach, it would appear 
useful to have a closer look at individual elections, especially if some of the 
parameters reported here appear odd. This could involve a more thorough 
breakdown of territorial units according to their unemployment experience 
along the lines briefly demonstrated at the end of the previous section. Re-
peated analyses of cross-sections could also be further differentiated according 
to relevant social characteristics of the territorial units; e.g., the political 
impact of unemployment in an urban-industrial context could be set against 
that in a rural environment. In this way, the shifting composition of unemploy-
ment in the FRG from the l 950s to the l 970s and l 980s could be taken into 
account. 
The step from repeated cross-sections to a truly longitudinal approach 
could be taken in (at least) two ways. First, the coefficients linking unemploy-
ment to election outcomes computed here ( or from more complex cross-
sectional designs) can be regarded as time-series to be related to, e.g., 
Unemployment and Elections in West Germany 61 
incumbency, objective or perceived macroeconomic conditions, or changes in 
overall social structure. Some of the previously proposed interpretations cor-
respond to such a logic of assuming that the changes of these coefficients over 
time can be systematically explained by third variables. In this way, the notion 
of an overall threshold level of unemployment at which political responses 
become visible could be empirically tested. 
Second, and this is a possibility offered only by this data set, the data 
could be rearranged to allow pooled analyses across all elections and counties 
(for an introduction to the methodology see, e.g„ Mundlak 1978; Sayrs 
1989), an approach that is rarely found in empirical politico-economic re-
search (for an exception, see Pollard 1981). Moreover, the data could also be 
used for time-series studies for individual counties or for any meaningful 
aggregation of territorial units. In contrast to pooled analysis, where cross-
sectional and dynamic components could be estimated simultaneously, such 
regionalized time-series studies would have to face a serious degrees-of-
freedom problem (for this type of analysis see, e.g„ Bellucci 1984), but the 
addition of state elections could help in this respect. Longitudinal investiga-
tions at the county level could, again, produce classifications of territorial 
units that might prove useful for further cross-sectional study. These few 
remarks do not exhaust what can and should be done in the future, but they put 
the first step taken here into perspective and outline the agenda. 
REFERENCES 
Bellucci, Paolo. 1984. "The Effectof Aggregate Economic Conditions on the Political 
Preferences ofthe Italian Electorate, 1953-1979." Europeanlournal of Political 
Research 12:387-402. 
Bloom, Howard S., and H. Douglas Price. 1975. "Voter Response to Short-Run 
Economic Conditions: The Asymmetrie Effects of Prosperity and Recession." 
American Political Science Review 69:1240-54. 
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper. 
Goodhart, C. A. E., and R. J. Bhansali. 1970. "Political Economy." Political Studies 
18:43-106. 
Hibbs, Douglas A. 1977. "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy." American 
Political Science Review 71:1467-87. 
Kernel!, Samuel. 1977. "Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative 
Explanation of the Midterm Congressional Decline of the President's Party." 
American Political Science Review 71:44-66. 
Kiewiet, D. Roderick. 1983. Macroeconomics and Micropolitics. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Kramer, Gerald H. 1971. Short-Tenn Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-
1964. American Political Science Review 65:131-43. 
Kramer, Gerald H. 1983. "The Ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate- versus 
62 Economics and Politics 
Individual-Level Findings on Economics and Elections and Sociotropic Voting." 
American Political Science Review 77:92-111. 
Krieger, Hubert. 1985. "'Anti-Regierungs-' oder 'Klientelenthese'? Wirkungen per-
sönlicher Betroffenheit von Arbeitslosigkeit ( 1980-1985)." Politische Viertel-
jahresschrift 27:357-80. 
Mundlak, Yair. 1978. "On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross-Section Data." 
Econometrica 46:69-85. 
Paldam, Martin. 1981. "A Preliminary Survey of the Theories and Findings on Vote 
and Popularity Functions." European Journal of Political Research 9:181-99. 
Pollard, Walker A. 1981. "Macroeconomic Etfects on U.S. Presidential Elections: A 
Study of Pooled State-Level and Time-Series Data, 1932-76." Washington Uni-
versity. fypescript. 
Rattinger, Hans. 1980. Wirtschaftliche Konjunktur und politische Wahlen in der Bun-
desrepublik Deutschland. Berlin: Duncker and Humblot. 
Rattinger, Hans. 1981. "Unemployment and the 1976 Election in Germany: Some 
Findings at the Aggregate and the Individual Level of Analysis." In 
Contemporary Political Economy, ed. Douglas Hibbs and Heino Fassbender, 
121-36. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Rice, Stuart A. 1928. Quantitative Methods in Politics. New York: Knopf. 
Sayrs, Lois W. 1989. Pooled Time-Series Analysis. Newbury Park: Sage. 
Schlozman, Kay L., and Sidney Verba. 1979. Injury to Insult. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
